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Abstract—Edge computing is providing higher class intelligent
service and computing capabilities at the edge of the network. The
aim is to ease the backhaul impacts and offer an improved user
experience, however, the edge artificial intelligence exacerbates
the security of the cloud computing environment due to the
dissociation of data, access control and service stages. In order to
prevent users from using the edge-cloud computing environment
to carry out lateral movement attacks, we proposed a method
named CloudSEC meaning real time lateral movement detection
based on evidence reasoning network for the edge-cloud envi-
ronment. The concept of vulnerability correlation is introduced.
Based on the vulnerability knowledge and environmental infor-
mation of the network system, the evidence reasoning network is
constructed, and the lateral movement reasoning ability provided
by the evidence reasoning network is used. CloudSEC realizes
the reconfiguration of the efficient real-time attack process. The
experiment shows that the results are complete and credible.
Index Terms—Network security, Edge Artificial Intelligence,
Cloud Computing, Correlation, Lateral Movement
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing services are critical information platform,
application and infrastructures resources that users access via
Internet[1-3]. These services, offered by companies such as
Google and Amazon, enable customers to leverage powerful
computing resources that would otherwise be beyond their
means to purchase and maintenance. The success of the cloud
computing has already changed the appearance of the world
information infrastructure.
In order to ease the backhaul impacts and offer an improved
user experience, edge computing are designed to share the
load of cloud center, provides an IT service environment and
computing capabilities at the edge of the network[4,5]. The en-
vironment of edge computing is characterized by low latency,
proximity, high bandwidth. Combined with the traditional
cloud computing environment, the edge computing enables
innovative services such as e-Health, augmented reality, smart
camera, gaming and industry automation [6].
The ”edge-cloud” model extends the complexity of cloud
services [7-11]. More authorities have to be transferred to the
edge participants, and more stages and data interactions will
be involved during the procedure of services [12-15]. As the
result, it turns out to be impractical to prevent all intrusions.
Thus, monitoring the operation of a system is essential to its
security. To that end, researchers collect monitoring informa-
tion to estimate the current state of the system based on the
usage patterns, detect whether there exist intrusions, and drive
response actions.
Lateral movement techniques are frequently used to launch
cyber-attack, especially in the hierarchical architecture system.
In the edge-cloud environment, two main challenges are in-
volved in the lateral movement detection.
1. The data persistence in edge computing may be different
with the traditional scenario, there is less certainty in where
data originated from, whether the data would be persistence,
and where it will be stored. Since the edge nodes are often the
limited memory and computationally constrained devices. The
traditional lateral movement detection methods which need
significant manual effort and business correlated knowledges
lacks the opportunity to flourish in such scenario.
2. The underlying architecture of the edge computing en-
vironment is often dynamic, for example, the vehicular frog
computing system based on the vehicle ad hoc networks. As
the result, the lateral movement detection methods that rely
on detecting changes in nodes behaviors may not be applied
successfully on the edge environment.
Existing solutions are with few considerations for such
scenario. When a host is discovered to be compromised, there
are a couple of fundamental questions that should always be
asked: What was the route this attack traverse? How was the
movement possible? What was the end target? What controls
were executed to make the threat persistent? In order to meet
these forensic requirement, the lateral movement detection
method should be applied to the edge-cloud computing en-
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vironments.
In this paper, we present a lateral movement detection
method based on Evidence Reasoning Network (ERN) for
edge-cloud computing environment referred to as CloudSEC.
CloudSEC introduces the concept of vulnerability correlation
and built an ERN based on the network system vulnerabilities
and environmental information. Experimental results show that
CloudSEC supplies a complete and credible evidence chain
and it also has the capacity of real-time lateral movement
reasoning. These provide a strong guarantee for the rapid
and effective evidence investigation. The contributions of
CloudSEC are threefold: First, it offers a list of concrete
evidence on the detected attack which gives more confidence
to the cloud service provider. Second, it enables the cloud
service provider to be fully aware the consequences of an
attack. Finally, it enables the cloud service provider to better
determine an appropriate course of actions that needs to be
taken.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
section 2, we present related previous works, such as event
correlation in virtual machine. In Section 3, we depict the
overall structure of our method. In Section 4, we present the
details of our proposed lateral movement detection method
and its correlation algorithms. The experiments conducted to
evaluate our method are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper with a summary and discussion of future
research directions.
II. RELATED WORKS
Up to today, there have been several proposed techniques of
analyzing android malware cloud data [16-20]. In this paper,
we focus exclusively on the related works using forensics
techniques on monitoring virtual machines in cloud computing
environment.
Most mature forensic investigation tools such as EnCase
[21] and Safeback [22] focus on capturing and analyzing
evidence from media stores on a single host. Mnemosyne is
a dynamically configurable advanced packet capturing appli-
cation that supports multi-stream capturing, sliding-window
based logging to conserve space, and query support on col-
lected packets [23]. Evidence graph network forensic analysis
mechanism [24][25] includes effective evidence presentation,
manipulation and automated reasoning. Although it is nice to
present evidence correlation in graphic mode, this system is
still a prototype and lacks the effective capability of inference.
Tian et al. [26][27] developed a network intrusion forensics
system based on transductive scheme and Dempster-Shafer
Theory (DST) that can detect and analyze efficiently com-
puter crimes in networked environments, and extract digital
evidence automatically. ForNet [28] is a novel distributed
logging mechanism that focuses on network forensic evidence
collection rather than evidence analysis. These approaches rely
on the long term log data collection or on the statistical-
based methods are not suitable for the poor data persistence
environment.
Different from the above-mentioned research, Walls et al.
[29] developed DEC0DE, a system for recovering information
from phones with unknown storage formats, which was a
critical hurdle in forensic triage. Because phones have myriad
of custom hardware and software, and all stored data must be
examined. Via flexible descriptions of typical data structures,
and using a classic dynamic programming algorithm, DEC0DE
system is able to identify call logs and address book entries
in phones across a wide range of models and manufacturers.
In [30], authors perform extensive study on existing fuzzy
hashing algorithms with the goal of understanding their ap-
plicability in clustering similar malware. They developed a
memory triage tool that uses fuzzy hashing to intuitively
identify malware by detecting common pieces of malicious
code found within a process. In [31], a host-based intrusion
detection system gained a high degree of visibility as it is
integrated into the host’s monitoring process. A new approach,
based on the k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) classifier, is used to
classify program behavior as normal or intrusive. Ko et al.
[32] introduced an approach that integrates intrusion detection
techniques with software wrapping technology to enhance a
system’s ability to defend against intrusions. In particular, they
employ the NAI Labs Generic Software Wrapper Toolkit to
implement all or part of an intrusion detection system as ID
wrappers.
Because the above host-based methods operate at a user
level, unfortunately, these systems are quite susceptible to
attacks once an attacker has gained access privilege to a host.
Besides, an operating system crash will generally cause the
system to fail to open. Since the host-based method runs in
the same fault domain as the rest of the kernel, this will
often cause the entire system to crash or allow the attacker
to compromise the kernel [33-35].
III. THE PROPOSED CLOUDSEC FRAMEWORK
The overview of the proposed CloudSEC architecture is
shown in Figure 1. CloudSEC consists of two components:
EventTracker and AlertCorrelator respectively. Each Virtual
Machine (VM) or the Container has a built-in EventTracker
that used to monitor user activities and detect intrusions by
auditing the event log on this system and analyzing commands
and tracing system calls made by the users. AlertCorrelator
is located at the edge of the cloud computing environment. It
correlates and analyzes alerts generated by multiple distributed
network Intrusion Detection Sensors (NIDS) deployed in a
specific cloud computing environment. A central management
unit is responsible for exchanging information, and put in place
a set of evaluation criteria used to evaluate the trustworthiness
of the results. In the following sections, we describe these two
above-mentioned components in detail.
The main idea behind CloudSEC is the modeling of ERN.
It is known that lateral movement is a sequence of small
attack units/steps happened in different times and network
locations following a certain logic. Each step of an attack
can be considered as a preparation step for the next one.
In ERN model, a detected attack step is referred to as an
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Fig. 2. Two basic structures of vulnerability correlation
evidence. If we can discover all hidden correlation in an
evidence chain, then a lateral movement is detected. Based on
the concept of vulnerability and vulnerability correlation, an
ERN is constructed to correlate and reasoning out evidence
chains and eventually achieve the goal of lateral movement
detection. To ease the understanding of ERN, we first describe
the concept of vulnerability and vulnerability correlation.
A. Vulnerability and Vulnerability Correlation
The concept of vulnerability refers to the defects of the
computer system following certain security strategy. Since
the vulnerability is an intrinsic factor of security incidents,
we define vulnerability and vulnerability correlation as the
following:
Definition 1. (Vulnerability). A vulnerability is a defect
exists in a software system or software component. The ex-
ploitation and utilization of such a defect would violate one or
more security policies and adversely affect the confidentiality,
identifiability, and usability of the software system. We note
a vulnerability as v in the rest of this paper.
Definition 2. (Vulnerability Correlation). Supposing that
a software system S has n vulnerabilities V [S] =
{v1, v2, · · · , vn}, if ∃Vli(i = 1 ∼ k ∧ k ≤ n) ∈ V [S] , so
that the attacker could launch a multiple stages attack with
vl1, · · · , vlk , then we say vl1, · · · , vlk are correlated, or we
say there exists a correlation among vl1, · · · , vlk.
Vulnerability correlation can be represented either as an
AND or an OR structure (as shown in Figure 2).
In an AND structure, the premise of utilizing vulnerability
v to attack the target system is to utilize all the vulnerabilities
of vli(1 ≤ i ≤ n, n ≥ 2). In an OR structure, the premise of
utilizing vulnerability v to attack the target system is to utilize
any one of the vulnerabilities in vli(1 ≤ i ≤ n, n ≥ 1).
Given the nature of an attack is to exploit one or more
existing vulnerabilities on a computer system, we need to
associate the attacks to the vulnerabilities. To do so, we map
the attack feature space into the vulnerability space, so that
we could describe the attack correlations in the perspective
of vulnerability correlations. Therefore, in order to form a
credible evidence chain, we construct an ERN to correlate
discrete attack evidences based on vulnerability correlation.
B. Evidence Reasoning Network Model
We use a directed graph to describe the connectivity and
vulnerability correlations of an information system network,
and denote it as an evidence reasoning network.
Definition 3. (Evidence Reasoning Network). Evidence rea-
soning network (ERN) is a directed graph G that is described
using a set of 5-tuples
{N,E,L,W,D}:
• N is a set of n vertex, each of which carries some vulnera-
bilities information. A tuple (ni, vi) together represents a
network node, where ni is the ID of the network node and
vi is a set of vulnerabilities on ni and 0 ≤ i ≤ n, n ≥ 0.
• E is a set of e directed links, each of which is an ordered
pair: ej(ej ∈ E) = ((nx, vx), (ny, vy)), where nx
contains vx and ny contains vy , 0 ≤ j ≤ e, 0 ≤ x ≤ n,
0 ≤ y ≤ n. Such a link ej indicating that (nx, vx)
interconnects with (ny, vy), and vx and vy have vulnera-
bility correlation. We say (nx, vx) is a parent node, and
(ny, vy) is a child node. For simplicity, we denote each
such directed link ej as nx → ny . For ∀(ni, vi) ∈ N , we
define IN(ni, vi) = {EI |EI = ((nl, vl), (ni, vi)), EI ⊆
E, (nl, vl) ∈ N, 0 ≤ l ≤ n} as a set of incoming link
with node (ni, vi) as a child node. Similarly, we define
OUT (ni, vi) = {EJ |EJ = ((ni, vi), (nm, vm)), EJ ⊆
E, (nm, vm) ∈ N, 0 ≤ m ≤ n} as a set of directed links
that have node ni as a parent node.
• L is a set of logical expressions representing the relation-
ships among the directed links using AND and OR logical
expression operators along with brackets. L is one-to-one
mapped to N , expressing the relationships among the di-
rected links going in or out each specific node. ∀(ni, vi),
if IN(ni, vi) = {e1, e2, e3|e1 = ((n1, v1), (ni, vi)), e2 =
((n2, v2), (ni, vi)), e3 = ((n3, v3), (ni, vi))} and li =
(e1 ∧ e2) ∨ e3, where li ⊆ L, nl ∈ N, 0 ≤ l ≤ n}, Then
parent nodes (n1, v1) and (n2, v2) both fall into an AND
relationship with (ni, vi). On the other hand, (n3, v3) and
(ni, vi) fall into an OR relationship.
• W is defined as a set of risk weights for each vertex in
N . W has an one-to-one mapping to N . ∀ni ∈ N , we
define wi = (fi+pi+ri)/3, where fi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
functional value of vertex (ni, vi), including information
servers, database servers, work stations, etc; pi ∈ [0, 1]
denotes the probability of successful exploitation of the
vulnerability vi on vertex (ni, vi); and ri ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the security impact of vulnerability vi. W is defined
to setup standard for evaluating the generated evidence
chain.
• D ∈ {qn, pptr} contains a set of data structures for
each vertex in N . It has an one-to-one mapping to N .
Here qn is a circular queue of length k for evidence
storage. Each element of the queue may be represented
as qn = {ts, cptr, wt}, here ts is the timestamp; cptr is
the pointer pointing to the child node used to reconstruct
an attacking process flow; s is used to show the state
of this node. Its value ranges from 0 to 3, representing
respectively: a start node, both a start node and a virtual
node, an intermediate node, or a virtual node; wt is the
risk weight. pptr stores a set of pointers pointing to the
parent nodes of this vertex. Such reversed pointers (i.e.
pointers pointing to the parent nodes) are used to speed
up the evidence reasoning process. For simplicity, we use
‘.’ to index each specific element. For example, di.pptr
or di.qni.ts.
The following set of steps describe briefly the procedures
to generate an ERN:
1) Report the topology of the target network by device
users such as the administrators or the node hosts of
the target network to be protect;
2) Use existing vulnerability scanning tools such as Nmap
and Nessus to probe the target network from different
locations within and outside the managed network do-
main;
3) Construct the vertex set;
4) Traverse all vertex in the target network and construct
recursively a set of directed links E and the logical
expression set L based on node connectivity and vul-
nerability correlations;
5) Compute W using the predetermined risk weights and
initialize data structure set D.
Obviously, the execution of step 1 and 2 depend on the char-
acteristics and scale of the target network topology. However
the efficiency and executability of the forensics can be solved
by pre-computing the ERN a priori.
Figure 3 illustrates an example of a network information
system including 5 linux systems (A, B, C, D, and E).
Server A has vulnerability v1 that threatens the root users,
and vulnerability v2 that threatens regular users. Service rshd
is running on B, which permits root users of A and D to gain
remote access on B executing shell command. The VM C
runs telnetd and rshd services. rshd allows only root user of
VM D to execute shell command remotely on C. C also has
vulnerability v4 that threatens all root users and vulnerability
v5 that threatens regular users. D runs sshd service. It has
vulnerability v3 that threatens root users. The edge container
E has vulnerability v6 that threatens all root users. All regular
users of A and the root user of C could gain remote access
to D as root users via ssh. The root users of B and E could
gain remote access to C as a root user through telnet.
The constructed ERN of the above information system
network is shown in Figure 4, including 10 network nodes,
and 11 directed links.
C. Evidence Chain Reasoning
ERN provides a framework for the reconstruction of at-
tacking flow and evidence chain reasoning. Each evidence
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Fig. 3. Example of information system network
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chain can be represented using a subgraph of ERN. The main
purpose of evidence preprocessing is to map the extracted
evidence out of the attack flows to the vertex of ERN, noted
as function map().
Evidence chain reasoning could be abstracted as the fol-
lowing: assume there is a time sequenced evidence list:
ε1, ε2, · · · , εn, for ∀εi = 1, 2, · · · , n, searching for the evi-
dence set within the range of ε1, ε2, · · · , εi−1, such that there
exists a directed link from map(εh) to map(εi) in the ERN,
noted as map(εh)→ map(εi), 0 ≤ h ≤ n.
The procedure of evidence chain reasoning includes the
following 3 steps:
Step 1. Initialization: fetch an evidence εi, and map it to
a vertex in the ERN of a given system, e.g., map(εi) = ni.
Then set di.qni.ts as the timestamp ti;
Step 2. Association analysis: the analysis methods depend
on the number of links pointing to a vertex ni in ERN:
1) When IN(ni) = 0, εi is the start point of this ERN.
Then set di.qni.s = 0, and di.qni.wt = wi;
2) When IN(ni) > 0, use reverse index data structure
di.pptr to find all the parent nodes of ni. If a parent
node nj’s dj .qn is non-empty, we say (nj , ni) is a truth-
value link.
• If the logical expression li returns a true value with
all the above-mentioned truth-value links, then we
say εi is an intermedia node. Thus we set cptr =
di.qni for all parent nodes that make li true, and set
di, qni.s = 2, di.qni.wt = wi;
• If the logical expression li returns a false value
with all the above-mentioned truth-value links, then
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(b) Timing independent evidence
chain reasoning process
Fig. 5. Evidence chain reasoning process examples
we know that εi has no correlation with the other
evidences. Thus we consider εi as a start node, and
set di.qni.s = 0, di.qni.wt = wi accordingly.
Step 3. Evidence chain generation: conduct breadth-first
search from a vertex ni in the ERN, of which the in-degree
is 0 (i.e. IN(ni) = 0), and generate evidence chain base on
the cptr of the traversed vertices.
Figure 5(a) illustrated the above-mentioned procedure. The
elements in the data structure D changes together with the
evidences as shown in Figure 4.
D. Timing Independent Evidence Chain Reasoning
Whether the evidence chain reasoning algorithm can draw
a correct conclusion depends on the correct time stamping of
the evidences. In order to solve the inconsistent time-stamping
problem, which is often a challenge, we propose a timing-
independent evidence chain reasoning algorithm. The process
is as follows:
Step 1. Initialization: fetch the next evidence εi and map it
to a vertex of the ERN of the given system, i.e. map(εi) = ni.
Then set di.qni.ts as the timestamp ti;
Step 2. Vertex checking: if di.qni.s = 1 or di.qni.s = 3,
then (di.qni.s)−−, di.qni, wt = wi, di.qni.ts = ti, then go
back to step 1, otherwise go to step 3;
Step 3. Association analysis: the analysis methods vary
based on different types of vertices of the ERN;
1) Case A: When IN(ni) = 0, εi is the start point, set
di.qni.s = 0, and di.qni.wt = wi;
2) Case B: When IN(ni) > 0, if we substitute all truth-
value links into li and li is true, then εi is an intermedia
node. Thus we set cptr = di.qni for all parent nodes
that make li true, and set di.qni.s = 2, di.qni.wt = wi;
3) Case C: IN(ni) > 0, if we substitute all truth-value link
into li and li is false, then traverse all parent nodes of ni
to search for one of the parent nodes nj which makes li
true when we increase a virtual record to nj . The virtual
record generated in the reasoning process indicates that
the evidence is not acquired by EventTracker, so the
risk weights are not taken into account (see further
explanation later in subsection III-F). We further conduct
association analysis on nj , if case A is met, then set
dj .qnj .s = 1, dj .qnj .cptr = di.qni, di.qni.s = 2,
di.qni.wt = wi; if case B is met, then set dj .qnj .s = 3,
dj .qnj .cptr = di.qni, di.qni.s = 2, di.qni.wt = wi;
if case C is met, then εi has no correlation with the
other evidences. Thus we take εi as a start node, and
set di.qni.s = 0, di.qni.wt = wi.
Step 4. Evidence chain generation: conduct breadth-first
search from a ERN vertex, of which the in-degree is 0, and
generate evidence chain based on the cptr of the traversed
vertices.
Figure 5(b) shows the approximate reasoning process, where
vertex 3 is a virtual record.
E. Time Complexity Analysis
Let N and E be the number of vertices and edges/links in
a given ERN. The first step of our evidence chain reasoning
algorithm finishes in constant time. The time complexity of
the second step is O(E/N). And the time complexity of the
third step is O(N+E). Therefore, the overall time complexity
of the evidence chain reasoning algorithm is O(N + E).
For the time complexity of the ‘Timing Independent Evi-
dence Chain Reasoning’ algorithm, the first and the second
step finish in constant time. Since the algorithm needs to
determine the status of one of the parents node of a virtual
node, the average time complexity of step 3 is O((E/N)2),
and BFS time complexity is O(N + E). For a directed
complete graph, E = N2−N , thus N+E ≥ (E/N)2. Hence,
the time complexity of the ‘Timing Independent Evidence
Chain Reasoning’ algorithm is O(N + E).
F. Power of the evidence chain
The power of electronic evidence refers to the persuasive
power of an evidence in proving the case. Given W of an
ERN defines the risk weight of every vertex, EventTracker
adds up the risk weight of all evidences on an evidence chain
and it will be used to evaluation the power of an evidence
chain.
As mentioned earlier, the virtual record generated in the
reasoning process indicates that the evidence is not acquired
by the EventTracker. Therefore, its risk weight is not added
into the overall weights W . Assume the sum of risk weights
of all evidences in an evidence chain is w, and the sum of
risk weights of all the virtual records on this evidence chain
is w′, the weight of the evidence chain should be calculated
as shown in formula 1. The bigger the value of confidence,
the bigger the evidence chain power.
confidence =
w
w + w′
(1)
G. The application of an ERN in EventTracker
System calls are generally used to change the states of an
operation system, such as creating files, forking processes,
changing registries, etc. Monitoring the changes of system
calls can get many essential characteristics of program oper-
ations, and thus form the basis of dynamic security analysis.
In an EventTracker, Virtual Machine Introspection technology
(VMI) is used to monitor system calls in cloud computing
hosts.
useradd 
groupadd 
passwd
uname
wget
admin.vbs /etc/passwd 
172.16.*.*
bash
Fig. 6. Example of evidence reasoning network for system calls
There are parameter dependencies among sequences of
system calls generated by program operation. EventTracker
maps system calls and their dependencies into an ERN model
as the nodes and the links respectively. For example, Figure 6
illustrates an example of an Evidence Reasoning Network for
system calls. First, an attacker uses useradd and groupadd
commands to add system users and set permissions. This
attacker then sets up passwords through passwd commands.
After checking the kernel version information with command
uname, ”admin.vbs” script is downloaded from the remote host
172.16.*.* through FTP.
The goal of an EventTracker is to identify complex lateral
movement attacks inside the cloud hosts. In the intrusion
detection literature, an attack scenario (or attack pattern) is
a sequence of explicit attack steps, which are logically linked
and lead to an objective. When a set of correlation is received,
if an attack scenario is detected, it will raise an intermediate
attack alarm, which will prompt the system to capture the
causal relationships among the evidences.
H. Design and implementation of AlertCorrelator
AlertCorrelator is located at the edge of a cloud computing
environment. It correlates and analyzes alerts generated by
multiple NIDS deployed in the cloud computing environment.
NIDS is responsible for monitoring network traffic in real time,
finding intrusion events and storing corresponding IP packets
in a database. According to the design of ERN, we can see
that AlertCorrelator does not tolerate false positives in alerts,
but it can accept a certain degree of false negatives.
AlertCorrelator collects and preprocesses the alerts first.
Every collected alert is coded and normalized into a stan-
dardized format. Additional information, such as timestamps
and source address of the attacker are also added into the
database. Events generated by different NIDS and related with
the same attack are merged into a single alarm. Then these
preprocessed alarms are added into the ERN as evidences in
a chronological order. At last, timing independent evidence
chain reasoning algorithm is called. In this phase, the ERN
model determines whether the attack is either a successful
attack or a non-relevant attack, i.e., an attack that does not
lead to lateral movement attack.
For large scale networks, when new NIDS are added to
the cloud boundary, augmenting an existing ERN can be
done easily in an iterative fashion. This demonstrates the high
scalability and flexibility of AlertCorrelator.
TABLE I
WEIGHT OF VULNERABILITY IMPACT
Vulnerability impact scope Weight
category
1
System administrators, managing system resources,
system files, system processes, and other resources 1.0
2 System administrator with partial permissions 0.8
3
Permissions of any number of system ordinary users
with more independent and private resources 0.6
4
Permissions of a system ordinary user and partial
permissions of other ordinary users 0.5
5
Permissions of a system ordinary user created by
the system initialization or created by the system
administrator with its own private resources
0.4
6 Partial permission of a ordinary user 0.2
7
Remote visitors who can access network services,
usually trusted visitors, who can interact with network
service processes, scan system information, and so on
0.1
8
Remote visitors who are connected to the target
system at the physical layer, usually untrusted or
firewalled visitors.
0.0
IV. EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
To further verify the effectiveness of our proposed method,
we developed our EventTracker prototype system using C
language on Linux RedHat 7.3. We use the intrusion detection
system Snort 2.4.3 as the attack detection component, and
use Graphviz to visualize the evidence chain. We conduct our
experiments on Shuguang servers (CPU 2.4G, MEM 8G). We
report in this section two sets of experiments.
A. Parameter Setup
In order to evaluate the power of the evidence chain, we
need to set an appropriate risk weights of ERN. Since the
difficulty of utilizing each vulnerability in different situation
is different, the probability of successful exploitation of each
vulnerability is different. In our experiments, we assume that
all the probability of successful exploitation of each vulnera-
bility are equal, and the functional attributes of network nodes
are also equal. As for the security impact of vulnerabilities,
we classify the vulnerabilities with the impact scope into 9
categories and set each category with a certain weight, as
shown in Table II.
B. Reasoning Result of the Lincoln Dataset
Experiment 1 uses the LLDOS1.0 and LLDOS2.0.2 data
sets from MIT Lincoln Laboratories. The test bed producing
this data set includes an external Internet environment sim-
ulated by 14 hosts, an internal network of 39 hosts, and a
DMZ area consisting of 6 hosts, covering operating systems
including Windows, Linux RedHat 5.0, SunOS 4.1.4, and
Solaris 2.7. Attack detection component is used to produce
an intranet data set of size 179 MB from each of the two
LLDOS datasets. The type and amount of evidences generated
are shown in Fig 7. Figure 8 shows the evidence chain deduced
by EventTracker on LLDOS1.0.
This evidence chain indicates the attacker’s five attack
phases: the attacker first scans the entire network from host
202.77.162.213 to learn the target host’s IP address range;
(a) Types and quantity of evi-
dences detected from LLDOS1.0
intranet dataset
(b) Types and quantity of
evidences detected from
LLDOS2.0.2 intranet dataset
Fig. 7. Categories and quantity of LLDOS dataset
then it executes Sadmind Overflow program with the ping
option checked in order to verify on each host whether
the Sadmind service is running. It then determines the final
destination host (e.g. 172.16.115.20 in Figure 5(b)); next,
the attacker uses the Solaris operating system’s Sadmind
vulnerability to implement a buffer overflow attack; after
gaining the root privileges, the attacker installs the Mstream
backdoor program through telnet and rpc; finally, the attacker
uses this compromised slave to launch a DDoS attack to
host 172.16.115.20/172.16.112.10/131.84.1.131. The evidence
chain of the above-mentioned attacking process is shown in
Figure 5(b). This result matches the documen provided by MIT
Lincoln, which proves the effectiveness of the proposed Event-
Tracker. Since there is no virtual records, the confidence is
100% in this case.
The deducted evidence chain of LLDOS2.0.2 is shown
in Figure 9. This evidence chain also contains a complete
attack sequence, and uses a springboard attack. Similar to
LLDOS 1.0, the attacker also implemented an attack on host
202.77.162.213, and succeeded in obtaining the root privileges
of hosts 172.16.115.20 and 172.16.112.50 that are using the
Solaris operating system with Sadmind vulnerability. However,
comparing to the former one, the LLDOS2.0.2 attack process
is more complex and with latency. For example, the attacker
did not use the ”ICMP echo reply” which could be easily
shielded. Instead, it uses the legitimate ”DNS HINFO” query
to obtain the target host (a DNS server). It is noted that the
shadow node ”FTP upload” in the evidence chain indicates that
the attacker used ftp to upload the evidence of the Mstream
backdoor program and attacking script. However, the attack
detection component missed this event. To ensure the integrity
of the evidence, EventTracker generated a virtual record.
According to the weights set in Table I, the confidence is
reduced to 86% accordingly. Then we use the timestamp of
the alert of “INFO TELNET access 119” to find the PCL. Two
relations were found which is shown in Figure 9. This further
proves the correctness of our reasoning algorithm.
C. Detection Result of Treasure Hunt Dataset
The second experiment uses the Treasure Hunt dataset col-
lected by the University of California Santa Barbara to guide
students in the design of network offense and defense course.
Its network topology is divided into three sub-networks:
Alpha, Omega, and DMZ, which includs MySQL servers,
202.77.
162.213
172.16.
112.50
172.16.
115.20 131.84.1.31
172.16.
112.10
Terminal
ICMP PING
RPC Portmap sadmind request UDP
RPC sadmind query with root 
credentials attempt UDP
RSERVICES rsh root
DDOS mstream handler to agent
BAD-TRAFFIC lookback traffic
INFO TELNET access
Fig. 8. Evidence Chain of LLDOS1.0 Intranet Dataset
202.77.162
.213
172.16.112
.50
172.16.115
.20 131.84.1.31
Terminal
FTP upload
RPC Portmap sadmind request UDP
RPC sadmind query with root 
credentials attempt UDP
RSERVICES rsh root DDOS mstream handler to agent
BAD-TRAFFIC lookback trafficINFO TELNET access
58
56
59
57
152
99
105
103
106
104
153
119
158
Fig. 9. Evidence chain of LLDOS2.0 data set.
event processing servers, file servers and WEB servers. Al-
though the network topology is not complex, a wide range
of attack methods are adopted in this network. Therefore,
we believe that this dataset is suitable for the edge-cloud
scenario functional testing of the proposed EventTracker. The
corresponding evidence chains are shown in Figure 10 and
Figure 11, respectively, with confidence interval of 91.7%
and 33.3%.
D. Performance Analysis
Table II gives the time overhead of CloudSEC in handling
the above sets of data. It is shown that the number of evidence
chains CloudSEC could handle per second is around 100.
According to [29], about 10-20000 security events per day
on average are detected by each detection point. CloudSEC
greatly exceeds the current actual processing requirements
192.168
.10.80
Terminal
ICMP PING
RPC request UDP
SCAN
SNMP request
RESERVICE reexc username overflow
DOS
SNMP trap tcp
192.168
.20.6
192.168
.20.49
192.168
.20.157
Fig. 10. Evidence Chain of the alpha sub-network.
192.168
.10.90
Terminal
ICMP PING
SCAN
SNMP request
DOS
SNMP trap tcp
192.168
.70.6
192.168
.70.157
192.168
.770.49
Fig. 11. Evidence Chain of the Omega sub-network
TABLE II
THE TIME OVERHEAD OF CLOUDSEC
Data Sets
Intrusion
Events
Process Time
(sec)
Average Processing
Speed (one event per
secnod)
MIT/LL 2000
LLDOS 1.0
DMZ 2498 15.9806
78.8505
Inside 905 16.7467
LLDOS 2.0.2
DMZ 1125 16.5234
Inside 624 16.0881
Treasure Hunt
Alpha 732 15.8154
119.8598
Omega 732 15.8154
under the conditions of real-time reasoning lateral movement,
this frontage is suitable for deploying in the edge-cloud
environment.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new method to track events
for Lateral Movement Detection. The concept of vulnerability
correlation is introduced. Methods on how to construct an ERN
based on the vulnerability knowledge and network environ-
ment information is provided. Then two lateral movement rea-
soning algorithms based on the constructed ERN are presented.
The proposed CloudSEC provides a strong guarantee for the
rapid and effective evidence investigation as well as real-time
attack detection, this advantage is more suitable for those
complex edge-cloud computing environments, for example,
the services based on the collaboration between the edge
artificial intelligence and the cloud computing. Experiments
using various real network datasets proves the correctness of
the proposed approach. Theoretical analysis concludes that
both chain reasoning algorithms achieve linear time complex-
ity. In the future, we aim at improving the performance on
ERN generation which further improves the overall CloudSEC
efficiency, at the same time multi-type of lateral movement
tricks will be evaluated.
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